## Using Systems Science to Optimize Health Security Coalitions & Networks

**Applications with the National Health Security Preparedness Index** 

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# Health security requires collective actions across many activities and sectors

- Surveillance
- Environmental monitoring
- Laboratory testing
- Communication systems
- Response planning
- Incident management
- Emergency response
- Surge capacity
- Management & distribution of countermeasures
- Continuity of healthcare delivery

- Community engagement
- Workforce protection
- Volunteer management
- Education & training
- Drills & exercises
- Information exchange
- Evacuation & relocation
- Infrastructure resiliency
- Protections for vulnerable populations

### Why a Health Security Index?

## Track national progress in health security as a shared responsibility across sectors

- Raise public awareness
- Identify strengths and vulnerabilities
- Detect gains and losses
- Encourage coordination & collaboration
- Facilitate planning & policy development
- Support benchmarking & quality improvement
- Stimulate research & innovation





### **Networks as Force Multipliers**

- Enhance coordination
- Accelerate information flow
- Acquire new ideas
- Spread innovations
- Build resilience



### Key questions to explore with the Index

- How do health security levels vary across states and change over time?
- What roles do networks and coalitions play in shaping the dynamics of health security?
  - Healthcare Coalitions
  - Other community networks
- How can we strengthen coalitions & networks to improve overall health security?

### **Measurement: National Health Security Index**

139 individual measures



19 subdomains



6 domains



- Weighted average
- State overall values



Unweighted average

National overall values

- Normalized to 0-10 scale using min-max scaling to preserve distributions
- Imputations based on multivariate longitudinal models
- Empirical weights based on Delphi expert panels
- Bootstrapped confidence intervals reflect sampling and measurement error
- Annual estimates for 2013-2016

Reliability by Domain	Alpha
Health security surveillance	0.712
Community planning & engagement	0.631
Incident & information management	0.734
Healthcare delivery	0.596
Countermeasure management	0.654
Environmental/occupational health	0.749



#### Methods & Data

#### **Index measurement domains & subdomains**



### Two Index measures capture network attributes

- Healthcare Coalition Membership Penetration
  - Local public health agencies
  - Local emergency management agencies
  - Hospitals
  - EMS agencies
- Comprehensiveness of Local Public Health Networks (Public Health System Capital)
  - Density
  - Centrality

### **Steady but slow progress**



\*statistically significant change

## The U.S. improved in most domains during 2013-16, except healthcare delivery and environmental health



\*statistically significant change

## Geographic disparities in health security are large and persistent



#### **Changes vary widely across states and domains**



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### **Network drivers: density & penetration**

#### **Participation in Healthcare Preparedness Coalitions**





### **Network drivers: density & centrality**

#### Communities with Strong Multi-Sector Networks (Comprehensive Public Health System Capital)





\*statistically significant difference

#### Unpacking public health system capital One of RWJF's Culture of Health National Metrics

- Broad scope of public health activities
- Dense network of multi-sector relationships
- Central actors to coordinate actions

#### Access to public health

4/2%

Overall, 47.2 percent of the population is covered by a comprehensive public health system. Individuals are more likely to have access if they are non-White (51.5 percent vs. 45.5 percent White) or live in a metropolitan area (48.7 percent vs. 34.1 percent in nonmetropolitan areas).

of population served by a comprehensive public health system

http://www.cultureofhealth.org/en/integrated-systems/access.html

### Mapping public health system capital



Mays GP et al. Understanding the organization of public health delivery systems: an empirical typology. *Milbank Q.* 2010;88(1):81–111.

## Organizational contributions to system capital, 1998-2016

#### % of Recommended Activities Contributed

			Percent
Type of Organization	<u>1998</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>Change</u>
Local public health agencies	60.7%	67.5%	11.1%
Other local government agencies	31.8%	33.2%	4.4%
State public health agencies	46.0%	34.3%	-25.4%
Other state government agencies	17.2%	12.3%	-28.8%
Federal government agencies	7.0%	7.2%	3.7%
Hospitals	37.3%	46.6%	24.7%
Physician practices	20.2%	18.0%	-10.6%
Community health centers	12.4%	29.0%	134.6%
Health insurers	8.6%	10.6%	23.0%
Employers/businesses	16.9%	15.3%	-9.6%
Schools	30.7%	25.2%	-17.9%
Universities/colleges	15.6%	22.6%	44.7%
Faith-based organizations	19.2%	17.5%	-9.1%
Other nonprofit organizations	31.9%	32.5%	2.0%
Other	8.5%	5.2%	-38.4%

### Health effects attributable to system capital

#### Impact of Comprehensive Systems on Mortality, 1998-2014



Fixed-effects instrumental variables estimates controlling for racial composition, unemployment, health insurance coverage, educational attainment, age composition, and state and year fixed effects. N=1019 community-years

Mays GP et al. Health Affairs 2016

#### Economic effects attributable to system capital

#### Impact of Comprehensive Systems on Medical Spending (Medicare) 1998-2014



Models also control for racial composition, unemployment, health insurance coverage, educational attainment, age composition, and state and year fixed effects. N=1019 community-years. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals Mays GP et al. *Health Services Research* 2017

#### Economic effects attributable to system capital

#### Impact of Comprehensive Systems on Life Expectancy by Income (Chetty), 2001-2014



Models also control for racial composition, unemployment, health insurance coverage, educational attainment, age composition, and state and year fixed effects. N=1019 community-years. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals

### **Conclusions & Implications**

- Health security driven in part by the strength of networks:
  - Healthcare Coalitions
  - Multi-sector public health systems
- Network strength varies widely across communities & changes over time
- Networks have large health & economic implications for their communities



#### **Conclusions and implications**

- Large health gains in places with strong system capital
- Larger gains for low-income populations
- Comprehensive systems do more than just plan: prioritize, invest, evaluate, repeat (crowd-sourcing)
- Equity and opportunity: more than half of communities currently lack comprehensive system capital
- ACA incentives and resources may help:
  - Hospital community benefit
  - Value-based health care payments
  - Insurer and employer incentives
- Sustainability and resiliency are not automatic

### **Caveats and cautions**

- Imperfect measures & latent constructs
- Timing and accuracy of underlying data sources
- Unobserved within-state heterogeneity
- Short panel
- Observational, not causal, estimates

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### **For More Information**



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Systems for Action National Coordinating Center Systems and Services Research to Build a Culture of Health



## Using Systems Science to Optimize Health Security Coalitions and Networks: Being Strategic with the Index

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Center for Public Health Systems and Services Research



## The 2017 Release of the Index



#### What the Index measures



#### What the Index measures



## **Cross Sector Community Collaboration**

 The coordination necessary to engage community-based organizations and social networks through collaboration among agencies primarily responsible for providing direct health-related services; partners include public health, healthcare, business, education, and emergency management in addition to federal and nonfederal entities necessary to facilitate an effective and efficient return to routine delivery of services.



## 6 Measures in this Subdomain

- M87 Is the state-level health department accredited by the Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB)?
- M501 Percent of population served by a comprehensive public healthsystem (scope of services and inter-organizational connectedness)



## 6 Measures, continued

- M9031 Percentage of <u>hospitals</u> that participate in Health Care Coalitions
- M9032 Percentage of <u>emergency medical</u> service agencies that participate in Health Care Coalitions
- M9033 Percentage of <u>emergency</u> <u>management agencies</u> that participate in Health Care Coalitions
- M9034 Percentage of <u>local health</u> <u>departments</u> that participate in Health Care Coalitions



## **Distribution of State (and DC) Results**

Variable	Label	Minimum	Mean	Maximum
M9031	Hospitals	47%	90%	100%
M9032	EMS	0%	37%	100%
M9033	EM	0%	66%	100%
M9034	LHD	0%	83%	100%
Grand Mean	Overall	26%	69%	100%



## Coalitions





## **CSCC Subdomain Index Results**





# Which states are low on the Index & low on the CSCC Subdomain?

**States Below the US Average: NHSPI & CSCC** 




## **Being Efficient & Strategic**

- Should we focus our efforts on these 12 states?
- Maybe, but we can be more strategic by combining these results with other factors that affect health preparedness, such as...
  - Culture of evidence-based planning
  - CDC Social Vulnerability Index
  - Level of Social Capital



## **Evidence-Based Planning**

- How States Engage in Evidence-Based
  Policymaking: A National Assessment
  - The Pew Charitable Trusts & MacArthur Foundation, January 2017



#### Figure 2 Assessing Evidence-Based Policymaking in the States





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#### Map1

Most States Show Modest Levels of Evidence-Based Policymaking



Source: Pew analysis of statutes, administrative codes, executive orders, and state documents

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## **CPE Domain by EBP**



Scores based on the total number of minimum and advanced actions



# **Planning Matters**



Scores based on the total number of minimum and advanced actions



Note: Statistically significant while holding per capita income, state fiscal health, and disaster experience constant

## **CDC Social Vulnerability Index**

What is Social Vulnerability?

"Every community must prepare for and respond to hazardous events, whether a natural disaster like a tornado or a disease outbreak, or an anthropogenic event such as a harmful chemical spill. The degree to which a community exhibits certain social conditions, including high poverty, low percentage of vehicle access, or crowded households, may affect that community's ability to prevent human suffering and financial loss in the event of disaster. These factors describe a community's social vulnerability." (Source: CDC)



## **CDC Social Vulnerability Index**

#### Methods

Variables Used

American Community Survey (ACS), 2010-2014 (5-year) data for the following estimates:





### Estimated State-Level Social Vulnerability Index





Note: The CDC Social Vulnerability Index is estimated at the county level. The author has "population-weighted" these county-level estimates to generate state-level values.

## **Social Capital Index**

- The Production of Social Capital in US counties
  - Rupasingha, A., Goetz, S. J., & Freshwater, D. (2006, with updates). The production of social capital in US counties. Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, 83–101.
- Factors include voter turnout, communitybased organizations (10), Census response rates, number of nonprofits



## **Estimated State-Level Social Capital**





## **Being Efficient & Strategic**

- Should we focus our efforts on these 12 states?
- Maybe, but we can be more strategic by combining these results with other factors that affect health preparedness, such as...
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## Low-Low by EBP

		Evidence-Based Planning			
		Trailing or Modest	Established	Leading	Total
l & main	Not Low- Low	25	9	5	39
NHSP CSCC subdo	Low on Both	10	2	0	12
	Total	35	11	5	51



# **Evidence-Based Planning**





# Low-Low by Social Vulnerability

		CDC Social Vulnerability Index			
		Above US	Below US	Within US	Total
n & Main	Not Low- Low	13	15	11	39
NHSF CSCC subdo	Low on Both	6	4	2	12
	Total	19	19	13	51



## **Social Vulnerability**





# Low-Low by Social Capital

		Social Capital Index			
		Above US	Below US	Within US	Total
n & main	Not Low- Low	11	14	14	39
NHSF CSCC subdo	Low on Both	3	5	4	12
	Total	14	19	18	51



# **High Social Capital**





### Overview

	Low			LowLow +
Coalitions	NHSPI,	LowLow +	LowLow +	Social
(low %)	Low CSCC	EBP (T/M)	SVI (high)	Capital
	(low-low)			(high)
AK	AK	AK		AK
AL	AL	AL	AL	
	AZ	AZ	AZ	
CA				
HI	HI	HI		
IA				
IL				
IN	IN	IN		
KS	KS			
MO				
NH				
NM	NM		NM	
NJ				
	NV	NV	NV	
OK				
PA				
SC	SC	SC	SC	
SD	SD	SD		SD
TN				
	ТХ	ТХ	ТХ	
VA				
	WY	WY		WY
18	12	10	6	3



## Conclusions

- The Index can be used as a tool to plan strategically
  - Where is planning capacity lower?
  - Which states are socially vulnerability?
  - Where is fertile ground for success?
- User can introduce additional dimensions
- Can be used at all levels of government



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### Using the Index to Assess and Address Climate-Related Vulnerabilities and Resources

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The following personal financial relationships with commercial interests relevant to this presentation existed during the past 12 months:

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- Outdoor air quality
- Surface and ground water quality
- Toxic substances and hazardous wastes
- Homes and communities
- Infrastructure and surveillance
- Global environmental health





### Impact of Climate Change on Human Health



Image Courtesy CDC: https://www.edc.gov/climateandhealth/offects/default.htm

### **Overview:** Index Environmental & Occupational Health Domain

MEASURING PREPAREDNESS

### ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS LEVEL NATIONAL CONFIDENCE INTERVAL

6.4 - 7.5

### WHAT IT MEANS

Actions to maintain the security and safety of water and food supplies, to test for hazards and contaminants in the environment, and to protect workers and emergency responders from health hazards while on the job.







- More than 40% of states have experienced declines in EOH protections since the first Index release in 2013
- 17% of top-tier states in overall health security are below the national average in EOH protections
- More than 1/3 of top-tier states in overall health security have experienced declines in EOH protections since the first Index release
- By 2016, the top EOH state reflected EOH protections 2.4X higher than its lowest-scoring counterpart





### Trends in EOH Protections: Geographic Disparities



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KEY

### Environmental & Occupational Health Domain Measures

FWS: FOOD WATER SECURITY EM: ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING			
he sufficient availab	ility, access, use, and protection of safe and clean food and water resources to support	human well-being and health.	
MEASURE	MEASURE DESCRIPTION		
m275_dw	Does your laboratory provide or assure testing for the following environmental matrices (D	irinking water)?	
m275_pww	Does your laboratory provide or assure testing for the following environmental matrices (P	rivate well water)?	
m275_rec	Does your laboratory provide or assure testing for the following environmental matrices (R	ecreational water)?	
m275_sur	Does your laboratory provide or assure testing for the following environmental matrices (S	urface water)?	
m275_ust	Does your laboratory provide or assure testing for <mark>the following env</mark> ironmental <mark>mat</mark> rices (U	Inderground storage tanks)?	
m275_wst	Does your laboratory provide or assure testing for the following environmental matrices (V	Vaste water)?	
m276	For which of the following organisms or their toxins does your state public health laborator outbreak investigations: Bacillus cereus, Brucella sp., Campylobacter sp., Clostridium botul monocytogenes, norovirus, Salmonella, Shigella, Staphylococcus aureus, STEC non-O157, of these tests performed.	ry provide or assure testing for food and or water samples to assist with foodborne disease inum, Clostridium perfringens, Cryptosporidium sp., Cyclospora cayetanensis, Listeria STEC 0157, Vibrio sp., Yersinia enterocolitica. The state's value is equal to the percentage	
m195	Percent of population in the state whose community water systems meet all applicable he water protection	alth-based standards through approaches that include effective treatment and source	





### Environmental & Occupational Health Domain Measures

	FWS: FOOD WATER SECURITY	EM: ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING		
The systematic collection response (warning and con	and continuous or frequent standardized measurement and observation of: environ ntrol), including monitoring the environment for vectors of disease to give informat	nmental specimens (air, water, land/soil, and plants) analyzing the presence of an i tion about the environment to assess past and current status and predict future tr	indicator, exposure, or ends	
MEASURE	MEASURE DESCRIPTION		SOURCE	
m202	Does your state public health laboratory provide or assure testing for air?			
m257_alha	Does the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) provide certification or accreditation	on of your state public health laboratory?		
m257_epa	Does the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provide certification or accreditation	of your state public health laboratory?		
m257_nelac	Does the National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Conference (NELAC) provide cer	tification or accreditation of your state public health laboratory?		
m197	Does your state public health laboratory provide or assure testing for radiologic agents in e	nvironmental samples?	$\sim$	
m196	Does your state public health laboratory provide or assure testing for environmental sample	es in the event of suspected chemical terrorism?		
m272	Does your state public health laboratory test for contaminants in environmental samples: a metals, microbial, lead, persistent organic pollutants, pesticides (including organophosphate the percentage of these tests performed.	asbestos, explosives, gross alpha and gross beta, inorganic compounds (e.g., nitrates), es), pharmaceuticals, radon, or volatile organic compounds? The state's value is equal to		
m273	Does your state public health laboratory provide or assure testing for hazardous waste?		<u>~</u>	
m274	State participates in the National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN)		$\sim$	
m904	Number of Environmental Scientists and Specialists, including Health per 100,000 population	on	<u>~</u>	
			PRE	

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### **Additional EOH-Relevant Measures**



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### Finalized State Climate Adaptation Plans













### Why?

m334	Do	Does state have a climate change adaptation plan?	
	Measure Name	M334	
	Measure Source	Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), State and Local Climate Adaptation	
	Data date(s)	2014 - 2016	
	Limitations	The measure is an indicator of state planning for climate change; however, it only indicates if a state has a plan. The quality of the plan is not evaluated. The degree to which the plan is being implemented is also not evaluated.	





### **15 Heterogeneous State Climate Adaptation Plans**

- Timelines
  - Plan finalization dates range from 2008 to 2016
  - 75% of coastal states had finalized plans before the first non-coastal state plan was finalized in 2011
  - Only 1 new plan since the first Index release in 2013
- Length: from 12 pages to >400
- Leadership
  - Most authored by governor-appointed commissions/task forces/steering committees
  - All steering committees included representation from state and/or local departments of environmental protection





**PREPARE** 


## Adaptation Goals by Sector (All States)







## **Common Themes: Adaptation Goals**

- Health Goals
  - Extreme Heat
  - Other Extreme Weather Health Hazards
  - Surveillance (Food, Water, Air)
  - Water Quantity and Quality
  - Vector Control
  - Smoke Emergencies
  - Vulnerable Populations
  - Preparedness Planning
- Emergency Management Goals
  - Early Warning Systems
  - Information Sharing
  - Emergency Response Planning







- Index findings can:
  - Point to gaps in protections at domain, subdomain, and measure levels
  - Be triangulated with other data to:
    - Prioritize areas for improvement
    - Examine potential drivers and contributors to gaps
    - Seek and learn from benchmarks
    - Identify and convene stakeholders
    - Develop and implement strategies for improvement
  - Track progress over time in target areas
- Including coalition partners in collaborative planning for climate adaptation and similar long-range strategic initiatives can help identify relevant protections to strengthen preparedness and health security





## Accessing Index Data





- Glen Mays, Michael Childress, Nurlan Kussainov, and Ann Kelly – National Health Security Preparedness Index Program Office
- Georgetown University, Georgetown Law, and the Georgetown Climate Center
- Robert Wood Johnson Foundation





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